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Abstract
This paper explores a novel secure wireless communication paradigm where the physical layer
security technology is applied to counteract both detection and eavesdropping attacks, such that the
critical covertness and secrecy properties of the communication are jointly guaranteed. To understand
the fundamental security performance under this paradigm, we first define a new metric-covert secrecy
rate (CSR) to represent the maximum transmission rate subject to the constraints of both covertness
and secrecy, and then provide theoretical modeling for covertness outage probability and secrecy outage
probability to depict the covertness and secrecy performances of the paradigm. We further conduct
detailed theoretical analysis to identify the CSR under various scenarios characterized by the detector-
eavesdropper relationships and the secure transmission schemes adopted in transmitters. Finally, numer-
ical results are provided to illustrate the achievable performances under the new paradigm.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, wireless communications suffer from various
security attacks, among which two typical ones are detection and eavesdropping [1], [2]. In the
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2detection attack, malicious detectors attempt to detecting the existence of signals transmitted from
certain transmitters, impairing the covertness of the transmissions [3], [4]. In the eavesdropping
attack, eavesdroppers manage to intercept the information conveyed by the transmitted signals,
degrading the secrecy of the transmissions [5], [6].
Classical technologies for guaranteeing the covertness and secrecy properties of wireless
communications are usually implemented at the upper layers of the protocol stack [1]. The most
representative ones are steganography [7] and cryptography [8]. The steganography technology
conceals messages in covertext objects (e.g., image, voice and video files) to achieve covertness
[9]. However, the messages remain in the covertext objects permanently and will be eventually
recovered by adversaries with high probability. Besides, the messages cannot be transmitted
without the covertext objects, which poses a significant challenge to the covert message delivery
when the transmissions of covertext objects are prohibited. The cryptography technology achieves
secrecy by using secret keys and complex encryption algorithms to convert plaintext messages
into ciphertexts [10]. The management of the secret keys and execution of the encryption
algorithms usually require a large amount of resources (e.g., bandwidth and computation power),
making the cryptography technology too expensive for resource-limited wireless networks, such
as sensor networks and the Internet of Things [11], [12].
To propose more promising solutions, security researchers have recently shifted their focus
to the physical layer security (PLS) technology. The fundamental principle behind the PLS
technology is to exploit the inherent physical layer randomness of wireless channels (e.g., noise
and fading) to achieve covertness and secrecy [13]. For example, transmitters can intentionally
inject artificial noise (AN) into their channels to hide their signals from detectors or to add
uncertainty to the information intercepted by eavesdroppers. Compared with the steganography
technology, the PLS technology directly hides the transmitted signals into channels without
relying on the covertext objects, thus improving the covertness and flexibility of the message
delivery. Compared with the cryptography technology, the PLS technology achieves a stronger
form of secrecy (i.e., information-theoretic security) at lower resource cost and thus is more
appealing for wireless communications [14]. Moreover, the PLS technology can also be used as
an effective supplement for the cryptography technology to significantly enhance the secrecy of
wireless communications [15].
Extensive works have been done to investigate either the covertness or secrecy issue of wireless
communications based on the PLS technology. For the introduction of these works, please refer to
3the Related Work section. These works focus on the traditional paradigms where only one attack
type exists, be it detection or eavesdropping. However, in practice, both attack types may coexist,
especially in some critical scenarios containing multiple groups with common or conflicting
goals, like military communications and coastal surveillance. Therefore, this paper aims to
explore a novel secure wireless communication paradigm where the PLS technology is applied
to counteract both the detection and eavesdropping attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper that jointly studies the covertness and secrecy issues of wireless communications
at the physical layer. We anticipate that this work can open a new avenue for the research on
secure wireless communications and inspire extensive high-quality subsequent works. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A novel secure wireless communication paradigm: In this paradigm, the PLS technology
is applied to guarantee the covertness and secrecy properties of wireless communications
against both the detection and eavesdropping attacks. To demonstrate the novel paradigm,
we consider six representative communication scenarios, which are characterized by the
detector-eavesdropper relationships (i.e., independence, friend and enemy) and the secure
transmission schemes adopted by the transmitters (i.e., a power control (PC)-based scheme
and an AN-based scheme). In the independence relationship, the detector group and eaves-
dropper group focus on their own attack without caring about the other. In the friend
relationship, the two groups exchange their signals received from target transmitters to
improve the attack abilities of both sides, while in the enemy relationship, the two group
intentionally send ANs to degrade the attack ability of the other. This new paradigm is
expected to serve as the benchmark model in this new research avenue.
• A new security metric characterizing both covertness and secrecy: Covert rate and secrecy
rate are typical metrics to characterize the covertness and secrecy properties of wireless
communications, respectively, while they fail to model the fundamental security performance
under the novel paradigm, where the two properties must be jointly guaranteed. This paper
therefore defines a new security metric called covert secrecy rate (CSR) to represent the
maximum transmission rate subject to the constraints of both overtness and secrecy. This
new metric is anticipated to serve as the fundamental security criterion in this new research
avenue.
• CSR analysis for the new paradigm: For the modeling of the CSR performance, the
4covertness outage probability (COP), i.e., the probability that detectors detect the transmitted
signals, and secrecy outage probability (SOP), i.e., the probability that eavesdroppers recover
the information conveyed by the signals, are first derived to characterize the covertness and
secrecy performances, respectively. Under the constraints of COP and SOP, an optimization
problem is then formulated and solved to obtain the CSR. Following these steps, we analyze
the CSR performances for the six representative communication scenarios. Finally, extensive
numerical results are provided to illustrate the CSR performances of the various scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work. Section
III presents an example system for the new paradigm and the definition of CSR. Theoretical
analyses for the CSR performance under the six communication scenarios are given in Section
IV, Section V and Section VI, respectively. Section VII provides numerical results to illustrate
the CSR performances and Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Available works have been focusing on traditional paradigms, where only the detection or
eavesdropping attack is counteracted. However, none of them jointly considered protecting trans-
missions from both attacks as in our novel secure communication paradigm. This significantly
distinguishes our work from the available ones. In what follows, we introduce the available
works related to this paper with a particular focus on the three-node scenario consisting of one
transmitter, one receiver and one attacker (i.e., detector or eavesdropper).
To secure transmissions from the detection attack in the three-node scenario, Bash et al.
[16] proposed a PC-based scheme to make the detector unable to distinguish between message
signals and background noise. Based on this scheme, they derived the scaling-law results of
the covert rate, i.e., the maximum number of bits transmitted per channel use without being
detected. This work was originally done for additive Gaussian white noise (AGWN) channels
with a static detector, and was later extended to the scenario with a mobile detector [17] and
other channel models such as binary symmetric channels (BSCs) [18] and discrete memoryless
channels (DMCs) [19], [20]. These scaling-law results show how the covert rate scales up as
the number of channel uses tends to infinity, while they fail to reflect the exact covertness
performances of more practical scenarios with finite parameters.
Thus, researchers began to devote their efforts to the exact covertness analysis. A variant
three-node scenario was considered in [21], where a greedy relay wishes to transmit its own
5covert messages to the receiver while forwarding the transmitter’s messages. To avoid being
detected by the transmitter, the relay adopts the PC-based scheme to control its transmit power.
For the covertness modeling, the authors derived the detection error probability of the transmitter
and also the covert rate. The authors in [22] considered a full-duplex receiver, which generates
AN while receiving signals from the transmitter in a Rayleigh fading channel, and obtained the
maximum detection error probability of the detector under a given constraint of the minimum
required covert rate. For scenarios with a half-duplex receiver, the covert rate performances were
analyzed under the PC-based scheme and various assumptions. For example, the detector was
assumed to have no knowledge about the time slots in which the transmitter sends messages
to the receiver [23], [24], about the instantaneous channel coefficient or statistical characteristic
of its channel [25], [26], and about the exact background noise power [27]–[29]. As building
blocks, the results in these three-node scenarios can also be extended to other scenarios, like the
multiple access channels (MACs) [30], broadcast channels [31], [32], relay channels [33], [34]
and multi-detector scenarios [35].
The study of securing wireless communications against the eavesdropping attack at the physical
layer was pioneered by [36], where the classic wiretap channel model and the notion of secrecy
rate were introduced. The results in [36] reveal that positive secrecy rates can be achieved when
the transmitter-eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the transmitter-receiver channel.
This work was later extended to other channel models, like the Gaussian wiretap channel [37],
the BSC [38] and the type-II wiretap channel [39]. Recent studies in this filed for three-node
scenarios mainly focused on the fading channel model and adopted the SOP [40] as one of the
main performance metrics and the AN-based scheme as one of the fundamental PLS techniques.
The authors in [41] adopted an AN-based scheme where the transmitter splits its power between
message transmission and AN transmission. Different from our AN-based scheme, the receiver
in [41] is assumed to be able to cancel the AN out from the received signals. The optimal
power allocation parameters were determined to minimize the SOP and maximize the secrecy
rate, respectively. A similar AN-based scheme was adopted in [42] for a scenario with an active
full-duplex eavesdropper, which also transmits AN while intercepting messages. Same to our AN-
based scheme, the cancellation of the AN from the transmitter is not available at the receiver
side. The SOP and secrecy rate performances were also optimized over the power allocation
parameter, respectively. Helper nodes can also be added to the three-node scenario to take over
the job of AN generation from the transmitter [43], [44]. The secrecy performance analyses in
6the three-node scenario can also be extended to other large-scale scenarios, e.g., like Ad Hoc
networks [45], [46], device-to-device (D2D) communications [47], [48], cellular networks [49],
[50] and the Internet of Things (IoT) [51].
III. NOVEL PARADIGM AND ITS SECURITY METRIC
To demonstrate the novel secure wireless communication paradigm, we consider a system (as
illustrated in Fig. 1) where a transmitter Alice sends messages to a receiver Bob in the presence
of a detector Willie and an eavesdropper Eve. Willie attempts to detecting the existence of the
signals transmitted from Alice, while Eve targets the messages contained in the signals. Alice
and Bob operate in the half-duplex mode, while Willie and Eve can operate in the full-duplex
mode when necessary. All nodes are assumed to be equipped with a single omnidirectional
antenna. For notation simplicity, we use a, b, e and w to represent Alice, Bob, Eve and Willie,
respectively, throughout this paper.
Time is divided into successive slots with equal duration that is long enough for Alice to
transmit multiple symbols. To characterize the channels, we adopt the quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channel model, where the channel coefficients remain constant in one slot and change
independently from one slot to another at random. We use hij to denote the coefficient of
the channel from i to j, where i ∈ {a, b, e, w} and j ∈ {a, b, e, w}. As assumed in [21], the
corresponding channel gain |hij|2 follows the exponential distribution with unit mean. We assume
that Alice knows the instantaneous channel coefficient hab but only the statistical characterizations
of haw, hae, hew and hwe. We also assume that Eve knows the statistical characterization of hae
and Willie knows the statistical characterizations of haw and hew.
A. Secure Transmission Schemes
To counteract the attacks from Willie and Eve, Alice first adopts a random on-off transmission
scheme, where she decides to transmit with probability q and thus suspends her transmission
with probability 1 − q in each time slot. We assume that this decision is only known to Alice
and Bob. When Alice transmits, she then employs two transmission schemes based on power
control (PC) and artificial noise (AN) injection, respectively. In the PC-based scheme, Alice
controls her transmit power Pa in order to hide the message signals into the background noise
to achieve covertness and secrecy. In the AN-based scheme, Alice intentionally injects AN into
the message signals to confuse Willie and Eve so as to reduce their attack effects. Different
7from the PC-based scheme, in the AN-based scheme, Alice uses a constant transmit power, also
denoted by Pa, and splits the power between message and noise transmissions. We use ρ ∈ (0, 1]
to denote the fraction of transmit power used for the message transmission. In addition to the
above strategies on transmit power, Alice also adopts the Wyner encoding scheme [36] to resist
the eavesdropping of Eve. To transmit a message, Alice chooses a target secrecy rate Rs for this
message and another rate Rt > Rs for the whole transmitted symbol. The difference Rt − Rs
represents the rate sacrificed to confuse Eve. We assume that Rs is fixed for all transmissions
throughout this paper.
B. Attacking Model
In practice, Willie and Eve can belong to different organizations with common or conflict-
ing goals, resulting in various relationships between them. In this paper, we consider three
representative relationships, i.e., independence, friend and enemy. As shown in Fig. 1, in the
independence relationship, Eve and Willie care only about their own attack without helping or
hindering the other. In the friend relationship, Willie and Eve will share their signals received
from Alice to help improve the attack power of the other. In the enemy relationship, Willie and
Eve intentionally radiate AN to degrade the attack power of the other.
To detect the existence of signals transmitted from Alice in each slot, Willie adopts the
commonly-used likelihood ratio test [52], in which he first determines a threshold θ and then
measures the average power P¯w of the symbols received from Alice in this slot. If P¯w ≥ θ,
Willie accepts a hypothesis H1 that Alice transmitted messages to Bob in this slot. If P¯w ≤ θ,
Willie accepts a hypothesis H0 that Alice did not transmit messages. Formally, the likelihood
ratio test can be given by
P¯w
H1
≷
H0
θ. (1)
In general, the likelihood test introduces two types of detection errors. One is called false
alarm, which means that Willie reports a detected transmission whilst the transmission does
not exist in fact. The other is called missed detection, which means that Willie reports no
detected transmission whilst the transmission exists indeed. We use pFA and pMD to denote the
probabilities of false alarm and missed detection, respectively. If neither false alarm or missed
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Fig. 1. Three relationships between Willie and Eve.
detection occurs, the transmission from Alice to Bob is said to suffer from covertness outage.
Thus, the covertness outage probability (COP) is given by
pco = 1− (pFA + pMD). (2)
The smaller the COP is, the higher the covertness of the transmission is. Note that 1− pco can
be interpreted as the detection error probability of Willie.
Compared with the detection of Willie, the eavesdropping attack of Eve is relatively simpler.
To intercept the transmitted messages, Eve tries to decode the signals received from Alice. If
Eve is able to recover the messages, the transmission from Alice to Bob is said to suffer from
secrecy outage. According to [40], the secrecy outage probability (SOP) can be formulated as
the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs [53] of the Alice-Bob channel falls
below the target secrecy rate Rs. We use pso to denote the SOP, which can be given by
pso = P(Cs < Rs). (3)
9Similarly, the smaller the SOP is, the stronger the secrecy of the transmission is.
C. Covert Secrecy Rate
To understand the fundamental security performance under the new paradigm, this paper
defines a new metric, called covert secrecy rate (CSR), by jointly combining the covertness and
secrecy. The CSR is defined as the maximum transmission rate under which both covertness
and secrecy can be ensured. To obtain the CSR, we formulate two optimization problems for
the PC-based and AN-based transmission schemes, respectively, which are given by
P1 (PC-based): Rcs = max
Pa
q(1− pso(Pa))Rs, (4a)
s.t. pco(Pa) ≤ c, (4b)
pso(Pa) ≤ s, (4c)
and
P2 (AN-based): Rcs = max
ρ∈[0,1]
q(1− pso(ρ))Rs, (5a)
s.t. pco(ρ) ≤ c, (5b)
pso(ρ) ≤ s, (5c)
where Rcs denotes the CSR, c and s denote the requirements of covertness and secrecy. Note
that Problem P1 optimizes the transmission rate over the transmit power Pa, while Problem P2
conducts the optimization over the power allocation parameter ρ.
IV. CSR ANALYSIS: THE INDEPENDENCE RELATIONSHIP CASE
In this section, we investigate the CSR performance under the independence relationship case,
for which we focus on the PC-based and AN-based transmission schemes in Subsections IV-A
and IV-B, respectively.
A. PC-Based Transmission Scheme
When Alice decides to transmit in a certain time slot, she sends n symbols to Bob, represented
by a complex vector x, where each symbol x[i] (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is subject to the unit power
constraint, i.e., E[|x[i]|2] = 1. Thus, the signal vectors received at Bob, Willie and Eve are given
by
yκ =
√
Pahaκx + nκ, (6)
10
where the subscript κ ∈ {b, w, e} stands for Bob, Willie or Eve, a represents Alice, and nκ
denotes the noise at κ with the i-th element nκ[i] being the complex additive Gaussian noise
with zero mean and variance σ2κ, i.e., nκ[i] ∼ CN (0, σ2κ).
According to the detection scheme in Subsection III-B, Willie makes a decision on the
existence of transmitted signals based on the average power P¯w of the received symbols yw. In
this case, P¯w is given by
P¯w =
∑n
i=1|yw[i]|2
n
= lim
n→∞
(Pa|haw|2 + σ2w)χ22n/n = Pa|haw|2 + σ2w, (7)
where χ22n represents a chi-squared random variable with 2n degrees of freedom. By the Strong
Law of Large Numbers [54], χ
2
2n
n
converges in probability to 1 as n tends to infinity. If P¯w ≤ θ,
Willie accepts the hypothesis H0 that Alice did not transmit messages, leading to a missed
detection. Thus, the probability of missed detection pMD is given by
pMD = P
(
Pa|haw|2 + σ2w ≤ θ
)
=
1− exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pa
)
, θ > σ2w,
0, θ ≤ σ2w.
(8)
The eavesdropping effect of Eve depends on the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs of the
Alice-Bob channel. According to [53], Cs is the difference between the channel capacity of the
Alice-Bob channel and that of the Alice-Eve channel. Thus, Cs can be formulated as
Cs = log
(
1 +
Pa|hab|2
σ2b
)
− log
(
1 +
Pa|hae|2
σ2e
)
, (9)
where log is to the base of 2. Note that |hab|2 is known to Alice and thus is treated as a constant.
The only random variable here is |hae|2. Based on the definition of the SOP in Section III-B,
the SOP pso under the PC-based scheme can be given by
pIPso(Pa)=P
(
Pa|hab|2
σ2b
− 2
RsPa|hae|2
σ2e
< 2Rs − 1
)
=exp
(
− σ
2
e
2Rs
( |hab|2
σ2b
− 2
Rs − 1
Pa
))
. (10)
When Alice does not transmit, only noises are received at Bob, Willie and Eve. In this case,
the secrecy of the transmission is not a concern. Thus, we focus only on the received signal
of Willie, i.e., yw = nw. We can see that the average power P¯w of the received symbols yw is
P¯w = σ
2
w. If P¯w ≥ θ, Willie accepts the hypothesis H1 that Alice transmitted messages, leading
to a false alarm. Thus, the probability of false alarm pFA is given by
pFA = P
(
σ2w ≥ θ
)
=
0, θ > σ
2
w,
1, θ ≤ σ2w.
(11)
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Combining the pMD in (8) and the pFA in (11), we obtain the COP under the PC-based scheme
as
pIPco (Pa, θ) =
exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pa
)
, θ > σ2w,
0, θ ≤ σ2w.
(12)
Note that the COP is identical for Alice and Willie, since they have the same knowledge about
|haw|2, i.e., the statistical |haw|2. To maximize the COP pIPco , Willie will choose the optimal
detection threshold θ, denoted by θ∗IP. We can see from (12) that p
IP
co is a decreasing function
of θ and is larger than or equal to 0 for θ > σ2w. Thus, the optimal θ
∗
IP exists in (σ
2
w,∞) and is
thus given by θ∗IP = υ + σ
2
w, where υ > 0 is an arbitrarily small value.
Under the condition that Willie chooses the optimal detection threshold θ∗IP, Alice solves the
optimization problem in (4) to obtain the CSR. The main result is summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the independence relationship and
Alice adopts the PC-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
RIPcs = qRs
(
1− pIPso
(
− υ
ln c
))
, (13)
under the following condition:
Rs ≤ log
(
σ2eσ
2
b ln c − |hab|2σ2eυ
σ2eσ
2
b ln c + σ
2
bυ ln s
)
, (14)
where pIPso(·) is given by (10). Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
Proof. We can see from (10) and (12) that, as Pa increases, pIPso monotonically decreases while
pIPco monotonically increases. Thus, according to the constraint (4b), the maximum allowable Pa
is given by
Pmaxa,IP = −
υ
ln c
. (15)
According to the constraint (4c), the minimum allowable Pa is given by
Pmina,IP =
(2Rs − 1)σ2eσ2b
2Rsσ2b ln s + |hab|2σ2e
. (16)
Note that the inequality Pmina,IP ≤ Pmaxa,IP must hold, which gives the condition on Rs in (14). Since
the objective function in (4a) is an increasing function of Pa, the CSR RIPcs is thus obtained at
Pa = P
max
a,IP , which is given by (13).
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B. AN-Based Transmission Scheme
Under the AN-based transmission scheme, when Alice transmits, in addition to the message
symbols, she also injects AN, represented by a complex vector z, where each symbol z[i]
(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is subject to the unit power constraint, i.e., E[|z[i]|2] = 1. Alice uses a fraction ρ
of her transmit power Pa for message transmission and the remaining power for AN transmission.
Thus, the signal vectors received at Bob, Willie and Eve are given by
yκ =
√
ρPahaκx +
√
(1− ρ)Pahaκz + nκ, (17)
where the subscript κ ∈ {b, w, e} stands for Bob, Willie or Eve and a represents Alice.
From (17), we can see that the average power P¯w of the received symbols yκ at Willie is the
same as that given in (7). Thus, the probability of missed detection pMD under the AN-based
scheme can also be given by (8).
Based on (17), we can formulate the secrecy capacity Cs under the AN-based scheme as
Cs = log
(
1 +
ρPa|hab|2
(1− ρ)Pa|hab|2 + σ2b
)
− log
(
1 +
ρPa|hae|2
(1− ρ)Pa|hae|2 + σ2e
)
. (18)
Thus, following the definition of SOP in (3), we derive the SOP under the AN-based scheme as
pIAso (ρ) = P
(
ρPa|hab|2
(1− ρ)Pa|hab|2 + σ2b
− 2
RsρPa|hae|2
(1− ρ)Pa|hae|2 + σ2e
< 2Rs − 1
)
= exp
(
− 2
RsρPa|hab|2σ2e − µσ2e
ρPa(2Rsσ2b − µ) + µPa
)
, (19)
where µ = (2Rs − 1)(Pa|hab|2 + σ2b ).
On the other hand, when Alice does not transmit messages, she still generates AN to confuse
Willie, which is different from the PC-based scheme. Thus, the signal vector yw received by
Willie consists of both the AN z and background noise, i.e.,
yw =
√
(1− ρ)Pahawz + nw. (20)
In this case, the average power of the received symbols of Willie is P¯w = (1− ρ)Pa|haw|2 +σ2w,
and thus the probability of false alarm is given by
pFA = P
(
(1− ρ)Pa|haw|2 + σ2w ≥ θ
)
=
exp
(
− (θ−σ2w)
(1−ρ)Pa
)
, θ > σ2w,
1, θ ≤ σ2w.
(21)
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Combining the pFA in (21) and the pMD in (8), we obtain the COP pIAco under the AN-based
scheme as
pIAco (ρ, θ) =
exp
(
− (θ−σ2w)
Pa
)
− exp
(
− (θ−σ2w)
(1−ρ)Pa
)
, θ > σ2w,
0, θ ≤ σ2w.
(22)
We can see from (22) that the optimal detection threshold θ∗IA for Willie exists when θ > σ
2
w
and can be obtained by solving ∂p
IA
co
∂θ
= 0. Thus, the optimal detection threshold θ∗IA is given by
θ∗IA = σ
2
w +
(ρ− 1)Pa
ρ
ln(1− ρ). (23)
By solving the optimization problem in (5) with θ = θ∗IA, we can obtain the CSR, which is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the independence relationship and
Alice adopts the AN-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
RIAcs = qRs
(
1− pIAso (ρ∗IA)
)
, (24)
where pIAso (·) is given by (19) and the optimal power allocation parameter ρ∗IA solves pIAco (ρ, θ∗IA) =
c with θ∗IA given by (23). Note that ρ
∗
IA must satisfy the condition ρ
∗
IA ≥ ρminIA with ρminIA given
by
ρminIA =
µσ2e − µPa ln s
2RsPa(σ2b ln s + |hab|2σ2e)− µPa ln s
. (25)
Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
Proof. Taking the derivative of the pIAso in (19) gives
∂pIAso
∂ρ
=
(1−2Rs)Paσ2e(Pa|hab|2+σ2b )2
[(2Rs−1)(1−ρ)P 2a |hab|2+(2Rs−1+ρ)Paσ2b ]2
exp
(
− (ρ2
RsPa|hab|2 − µ)σ2e
(µ+ρσ2b )Pa−(2Rs−1)ρP 2a |hab|2
)
,
(26)
which implies that, as ρ increases, pIAso decreases while the objective function in (5a) increases.
Thus, the maximum allowable ρ is the optimal power allocation parameter ρ∗IA.
Substituting θ = θ∗IA, where θ
∗
IA is given by (23), into (22) yields
pIAco = ρ(1− ρ)
1−ρ
ρ . (27)
Next, taking the derivative of the pIAco in (27) in terms of ρ, we have
∂pIAco
∂ρ
=
− ln(1− ρ)
ρ
(1− ρ) 1−ρρ > 0, (28)
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which shows that pIAco is a decreasing function of ρ. Thus, according to the constraint (5b), the
maximum allowable ρ (i.e., the ρ∗IA) solves the equation p
IA
co (ρ) = c. Substituting the ρ
∗
IA into
(19) gives the CSR in (24).
In addition, based on the constraint (5c) and the monotonicity of pIAso with respect to ρ, the
minimum power allocation parameter ρminIA can be given by (25). Note that ρ
∗
IA ≥ ρminIA must
hold. Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
V. CSR ANALYSIS: THE FRIEND RELATIONSHIP CASE
The CSR performance of the friend relationship case is investigated in this section, for
which the CSR analyses for the PC-based and AN-based transmission schemes are provided
in Subsections V-A and V-B, respectively. To characterize the friend relationship, we interpret
Willie and Eve as two antennas of a super attacker. This model is widely used to characterize
the collusion among eavesdroppers in PLS-related research [55].
A. PC-Based Transmission Scheme
When Alice transmits a signal vector x, Bob receives the same signal vector yb as that given in
(6) under the independence relationship case. However, since Willie and Eve share their received
signals in this case, the signal vectors received at Willie and Eve are given by
yκ =
√
Pahawx +
√
Pahaex + ne + nw, (29)
where the subscript κ ∈ {w, e} stands for Willie or Eve and a represents Alice.
Following the analysis in Subsection IV-A, the average power P¯w of the received symbols yw
at Willie is given by
P¯w = Pa|haw|2 + Pa|hae|2 + σ2e + σ2w. (30)
Note that |haw|2 and |hae|2 are random variables for Willie. Thus, the probability of missed
detection pMD is given by
pMD = P
(
Pa|haw|2 + Pa|hae|2 + σ2e + σ2w ≤ θ
)
=
1−
Pa+θ−σ2e−σ2w
Pa
exp
(
− θ−σ2e−σ2w
Pa
)
, θ > σ2e+σ
2
w,
0, θ ≤ σ2e+σ2w.
(31)
According to (29), we can formulate the secrecy capacity Cs as
Cs = log
(
1 +
Pa|hab|2
σ2b
)
− log
(
1 +
Pa|hae|2 + Pa|haw|2
σ2e + σ
2
w
)
. (32)
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Note that from the viewpoint of Alice, the random variables here are |hae|2 and |haw|2, which
are independent. Based on (32) and the definition of SOP in (3), the SOP under the PC-based
scheme is given by
pFPso (Pa) = P
(
Pa|hab|2
σ2b
− 2RsPa|hae|
2 + Pa|haw|2
σ2e + σ
2
w
< 2Rs − 1
)
=
(
1 +
σ2e + σ
2
w
2Rs
( |hab|2
σ2b
− 2
Rs − 1
Pa
))
exp
(
−σ
2
e+σ
2
w
2Rs
( |hab|2
σ2b
− 2
Rs−1
Pa
))
. (33)
Next, we consider the case where Alice suspends her transmission. Since the decision of
suspending transmission is not known to Willie and Eve, they still share their signals, which
contain only background noises in this case. Thus, the received signal at Willie is given by
yw = ne + nw. (34)
Hence, the average power P¯w of the received signal of Willie is P¯w = σ2e+σ
2
w and the probability
of false alarm pFA can be given by
pFA = P
(
σ2e + σ
2
w ≥ θ
)
=
0, θ > σ
2
e + σ
2
w,
1, θ ≤ σ2e + σ2w.
(35)
Combining the pFA in (35) and the pMD in (31), we obtain the COP as
pFPco (Pa, θ) =

Pa+θ−σ2e−σ2w
Pa
exp
(
− θ−σ2e−σ2w
Pa
)
, θ > σ2e + σ
2
w,
0, θ ≤ σ2e + σ2w.
(36)
Taking the derivative of the pFPco in (36) gives
∂pFPco
∂θ
= −θ − σ
2
e − σ2w
P 2a
exp
(
−θ − σ
2
e − σ2w
Pa
)
, (37)
which proves that pFPco is a decreasing function of θ when θ > σ
2
e + σ
2
w. Thus, the optimal
detection threshold is
θ∗FP = υ + σ
2
e + σ
2
w, (38)
where υ > 0 is an arbitrarily small value.
Given the θ∗FP, the SOP in (33) and the COP in (36), the problem in (4) can now be solved
to obtain the CSR. The result is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the friend relationship and Alice
adopts the PC-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
RFPcs =qRs(1− pFPso (P ∗a,FP)), (39)
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where pFPso (·) is given by (33) and the optimal transmit power P ∗a,FP solves pFPco (Pa, θ∗FP) = c
with θ∗FP given by (38). Note that the inequality P
∗
a,FP ≥ Pmina,FP must hold, where Pmina,FP solves
pFPso (Pa) = s. Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and thus omitted here.
B. AN-Based Transmission Scheme
When Alice transmits under the AN-based scheme, the received signal vector at Bob is
identical to (17), while the signal vectors at Willie and Eve also contain the signal shared
by the other side. Thus, the signal vectors received at Willie and Eve are given by
yκ =
√
ρPahawx +
√
(1− ρ)Pahawz +
√
ρPahaex +
√
(1− ρ)Pahaez + ne + nw, (40)
where the subscript κ ∈ {w, e} stands for Willie or Eve and a represents Alice.
In this case, the average power P¯w of the received symbols yκ at Willie is the same as that
given in (30), and thus the probability of missed detection pMD can be given by (31).
Based on (40), the secrecy capacity Cs under the AN-based scheme can be formulated by
Cs = log
(
1+
ρPa|hab|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hab|2+σ2b
)
−log
(
1+
ρPa|hae|2+ρPa|haw|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hae|2+(1−ρ)Pa|haw|2+σ2e+σ2w
)
, (41)
where the random variables are |hae|2 and |haw|2 for Alice. According to the definition in (3),
the SOP is given by
pFAso (ρ) = P
(
ρPa|hab|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hab|2+σ2b
− 2
Rs(ρPa|hae|2 + ρPa|haw|2)
(1−ρ)Pa|hae|2+(1−ρ)Pa|haw|2+σ2e+σ2w
< 2Rs − 1
)
=
(
1 +
φ(σ2e + σ
2
w)
((1 + φ)ρ− φ)Pa
)
exp
(
− φ(σ
2
e + σ
2
w)
((1 + φ)ρ− φ)Pa
)
, (42)
where φ =
(
ρPa|hab|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hab|2+σ2b
− 2Rs + 1
)
/2Rs .
When Alice does not transmit messages, she still sends AN to confuse Willie. Thus, the signal
vector yw contains both the signals (i.e., AN and background noise) shared by Eve, AN and
background noise, which is given by
yw =
√
(1− ρ)Pahawz +
√
(1− ρ)Pahaez + ne + nw. (43)
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In this case, the average power of the received symbols at Willie is P¯w = (1 − ρ)Pa|haw|2 +
(1− ρ)Pa|hae|2 + σ2e + σ2w. Thus, the probability of false alarm pFA is given by
pFA = P
(
(1− ρ)Pa|haw|2 + (1− ρ)Pa|hae|2 + σ2e + σ2w ≥ θ
)
=

(
1 + θ−σ
2
e−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
exp
(
− θ−σ2e−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
, θ > σ2e + σ
2
w,
1, θ ≤ σ2e + σ2w.
(44)
Combining the pFA in (44) and the pMD in (31), the COP can be given by
pFAco (ρ, θ)=

(
1+ θ−σ
2
e−σ2w
Pa
)
exp
(
− θ−σ2e−σ2w
Pa
)
−
(
1+ θ−σ
2
e−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
exp
(
− θ−σ2e−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
, θ > σ2e + σ
2
w,
0, θ ≤ σ2e + σ2w.
(45)
We can see from (45) that the optimal detection threshold θ∗FA can be obtained by solving
∂pFAco
∂θ
= 0, which is
θ∗FA = σ
2
e + σ
2
w +
2(ρ− 1)Pa
ρ
ln(1− ρ). (46)
Given the θ∗FA in (46), we solve the optimization problem in (5) to obtain the CSR, which is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the friend relationship and Alice
adopts the AN-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
RFAcs = qRs(1− pFAso (ρ∗FA)), (47)
where pFAso (·) is given by (42) and the optimal power allocation parameter ρ∗FA solves pFAco (ρ, θ∗FA) =
c with θ∗FA given by (46). Note that ρ
∗
FA must satisfy the following constraints:
• pFAso (ρ
∗
FA, θ
∗
FA) ≤
(
1− σ2e+σ2w
Pa
)
exp
(
σ2e+σ
2
w
Pa
)
;
• ρ∗FA ≥ ρL, where ρL is the larger one of the two solutions of pFAso (ρ, θ∗FA) = s.
Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
Proof. Substituting the θ∗FA in (46) into (45), and then taking the derivative of (45) regarding ρ
shows that pFAco increases monotonically as ρ increases. Thus, according to the constraint (5b),
the region of ρ for ensuring covertness is (0, ρ∗FA], where ρ
∗
FA is the solution of p
FA
co (ρ, θ
∗
FA) = c.
Taking the derivative of pFAso in (42) regarding ρ, we can see that as ρ increases, p
FA
so first
increases and then decreases. Thus, the objective function in (5a) first decreases and then
increases as ρ increases. Next, based on the secrecy constraint in (5c), we determine the feasible
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region of ρ as well as the optimal ρ∗FA, which will be discussed under three cases as depicted
in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
In Case 1, the secrecy constraint in (5c) yields two feasible regions of ρ for ensuring secrecy,
i.e., (0, ρS] and [ρL, 1] as shown in Fig. 2, where ρS and ρL denote the smaller and larger
solutions of pFAso (ρ, θ
∗
FA) = s. The feasible region of ρ (depicted by the gray region in Fig. 2)
is thus the overlap between the covertness region (0, ρ∗FA] and the secrecy regions. Fig. 2 shows
that the feasible region varies with the value of ρ∗FA. We can observe that if ρ
∗
FA ≤ ρS < ρL or
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ρS < ρ
∗
FA < ρL, the optimal ρ is asymptotically approaching zero but not available. For ρS <
ρL ≤ ρ∗FA, the optimal ρ can be ρ∗FA if pFAso (ρ∗FA) ≤ limρ→0 pFAso (ρ) =
(
1− σ2e+σ2w
Pa
)
exp
(
σ2e+σ
2
w
Pa
)
.
Otherwise, the optimal ρ is not available and neither is the CSR. For the other two cases with
only one solution to the equation pFAso (ρ, θ
∗
FA) = s, be it ρS or ρL (as shown in Fig. 3 and Fig.
4), the optimal ρ∗FA can be found following the same approach. Thus, the discussions are omitted
here. Summarizing the results of the three cases completes the proof.
VI. CSR ANALYSIS: THE ENEMY RELATIONSHIP
This section focuses on the CSR analysis for the enemy relationship case. The results under the
PC-based scheme and AN-based scheme are given in Subsections VI-A and VI-B, respectively.
A. PC-Based Transmission Scheme
In the enemy relationship case, Willie and Eve generate AN to reduce the attacking power of
the other. Thus, under the PC-based transmission scheme, when Alice transmits, in addition to
the information signals x from Alice, Bob also receives ANs vw and ve from both Willie and
Eve, respectively. Each AN symbol vw[i] (resp. ve[i]) (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) is subject to the unit
power constraint, i.e., E[|vw[i]|2] = 1 (resp. E[|ve[i]|2] = 1). Thus, the received signal vector at
Bob is given by
yb =
√
Pahabx +
√
Pwhwbvw +
√
Pehebve + nb, (48)
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where Pw and Pe denote the transmit powers of Willie and Eve, respectively. We assume that
both Willie and Eve can eliminate the AN from itself. Thus, the received signal vectors at Willie
and Eve are given by
yw =
√
Pahawx +
√
Pehewve + nw, (49)
and
ye =
√
Pahaex +
√
Pwhwevw + ne. (50)
According to (49), we can obtain the average power P¯w of the received symbols yw at Willie
as
P¯w = Pa|haw|2 + Pe|hew|2 + σ2w. (51)
Based on (51), the probability of missed detection pMD under the PC-based scheme can be given
by
pMD=P
(
Pa|haw|2+Pe|hew|2+σ2w≤θ
)
=
1+
Pe
Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pe
)
− Pa
Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pa
)
, θ>σ2w,
0, θ≤σ2w.
(52)
Based on (48) and (50), we can formulate the secrecy capacity Cs as
Cs = log
(
1 +
Pa|hab|2
Pw|hwb|2 + Pe|heb|2 + σ2b
)
− log
(
1 +
Pa|hae|2
Pw|hwe|2 + σ2e
)
. (53)
Thus, the SOP under the PC-based scheme can be given by
pEPso (Pa)=P
(
Pa|hab|2
Pw|hwb|2 + Pe|heb|2 + σ2b
− 2
RsPa|hae|2
Pw|hwe|2 + σ2e
< 2Rs − 1
)
=
∫ Pa|hab|2
Pe(2Rs−1)
−σ
2
b
Pe
0
∫ Pa|hab|2
Pw(2Rs−1)
−Pez+σ
2
b
Pw
0
2RsPa(Pwy + Pez + σ
2
b )
PaPw|hab|2−(Pw(2Rs−1)−2RsPa)(Pwy+Pez+σ2b )
× exp
[
−
( |hab|2σ2e
2Rs(Pwy + Pez + σ2b )
+ y − σ
2
e(2
Rs − 1)
2RsPa
+ z
)]
dy dz. (54)
When Alice does not transmit, Willie receives the AN from Eve together with his background
noise. Thus, the received signal vector at Willie is given by
yw =
√
Pehewve + nw. (55)
In this case, the average power P¯w is given by
P¯w = Pe|hew|2 + σ2w. (56)
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Based on (56), the probability of false alarm pFA is given by
pFA = P
(
Pe|hew|2 + σ2w ≥ θ
)
=
exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pe
)
, θ > σ2w,
1, θ ≤ σ2w.
(57)
Combining the pMD in (52) and the pFA in (57) gives the COP pEPco under the PC-based
scheme, which is
pEPco (Pa, θ) =

Pa
Pa−Pe
[
exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pa
)
− exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pe
)]
, θ > σ2w,
0, θ ≤ σ2w.
(58)
We can see from (58) that the optimal detection threshold θ∗EP exists when θ > σ
2
w and can
be obtained by solving ∂pEPco /∂θ = 0. Thus, θ
∗
EP is given by
θ∗EP =
PaPe
Pa − Pe ln
Pa
Pe
+ σ2w. (59)
By solving the optimization problem P1 with θ = θ∗EP, we obtain the CSR under the PC-based
transmission scheme. The result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the enemy relationship and Alice
adopts the PC-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
REPcs = qRs(1− pEPso (P ∗a,EP)), (60)
where pEPso (·) is given by (54) and the optimal transmit power P ∗a,EP solves pEPco (Pa, θ∗EP) = c
with θ∗EP given by (59). Note that the inequality P
∗
a,EP ≥ Pmina,EP must hold, where Pmina,EP solves
pEPso (Pa) = s. Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and thus omitted here.
B. AN-Based Transmission Scheme
Under the AN-based scheme, when Alice transmits, the received signal vectors at Bob, Willie
and Eve are respectively given by
yb =
√
ρPahabx +
√
(1− ρ)Pahabz +
√
Pwhwbvw +
√
Pehebve + nb, (61)
yw =
√
ρPahawx +
√
(1− ρ)Pahawz +
√
Pehewve + nw, (62)
and
ye =
√
ρPahaex +
√
(1− ρ)Pahaez +
√
Pwhwevw + ne. (63)
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We can see from (62) that the average power P¯w of the received symbols yw at Willie is the
same as that given in (51). Thus, the probability of missed detection pMD under the AN-based
scheme can be given by (52).
Based on (61) and (63), the secrecy capacity Cs can be given by
Cs=log
(
1+
ρPa|hab|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hab|2+Pw|hwb|2+Pe|heb|2+σ2b
)
−log
(
1+
ρPa|hae|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hae|2+Pw|hwe|2+σ2e
)
.
(64)
Thus, the SOP under the AN-based scheme can be derived as
pEAso (ρ)=P
(
ρPa|hab|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hab|2+Pw|hwb|2+Pe|heb|2+σ2b
− 2
RsρPa|hae|2
(1−ρ)Pa|hae|2+Pw|hwe|2+σ2e
<2Rs−1
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[
(2Rs − 1)Pezγ1 + α1(z)δ1 + β1γ1
α1(z)γ1 + γ21y
+
γ1 − δ1
γ1
]
× exp
(
−y − (2
Rs − 1)Pezσ2eγ2 + α2(z)δ2 + β2γ2
α2(z)γ2 + γ22y
+
δ2
γ2
− z
)
dy dz, (65)
where
α1(z) = 2
RsρPa(Pez + ν)− ((1− ρ)Pa − Pw)[ρPa|hab|2 − (2Rs − 1)(Pez + ν)],
α2(z) = 2
RsρPa(Pez + ν)− (1− ρ)Pa
[
ρPa|hab|2(2Rs − 1)(Pez + ν)
]
.
Here, β1 = ρPaPw|hab|2− (2Rs − 1)((1− ρ)Pa|hab|2 + σ2b )Pw, β2 = (ρPa|hab|2− (2Rs − 1)ν)σ2e ,
γ1 = 2
RsρPaPw + Pw(2
Rs − 1)((1 − ρ)Pa − Pw), γ2 = 2RsρPaPw + (2Rs − 1)(1 − ρ)PaPw,
δ1 = (2
Rs − 1)P 2w, δ2 = (2Rs − 1)Pwσ2e and ν = (1− ρ)Pa|hab|2 + σ2b .
When Alice does not transmit, the received signal vector at Willie is given by
yw =
√
(1− ρ)Pahawz +
√
Pehewve + nw. (66)
In this case, the average power P¯w is given by
P¯w = (1− ρ)Pa|haw|2 + Pe|hew|2 + σ2w. (67)
Based on (67), we can derive the probability of false alarm pFA as
pFA = P
(
(1− ρ)Pa|haw|2 + Pe|hew|2 + σ2w ≥ θ
)
=

(1−ρ)Pa
(1−ρ)Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
− Pe
(1−ρ)Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pe
)
, θ > σ2w,
1, θ ≤ σ2w,
(68)
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Fig. 5. The COP and an approximate COP with the approximate θ in (70).
Combining the pMD in (52) and pFA in (68), we obtain the COP pEAco under the AN-based
scheme as
pEAco (ρ, θ)=

Pa
Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pa
)
− (1−ρ)Pa
(1−ρ)Pa−Pe exp
(
− θ−σ2w
(1−ρ)Pa
)
+ ρPaPe
(Pa−Pe)((1−ρ)Pa−Pe)exp
(
− θ−σ2w
Pe
)
, θ>σ2w,
0, θ≤σ2w.
(69)
Note that the optimal detection threshold θ is difficult to obtain from (69). Thus, we resort to
an approximation, which can be given by
θ∗EA ≈ σ2w +
(ρ− 1)Pa
ρ
ln(1− ρ) + ρPaPe
Pa − Pe ln
Pa
Pe
. (70)
We can see from Fig. 5 that the COPs achieved at the optimal θ under different settings of Pa
and Pe are close to those achieved at the approximated optimal θ in (70). This implies that the
approximation is accurate enough, and thus we use the approximated optimal θ in (70) to solve
the optimization problem P1. After solving the optimization problem P1, we obtain the CSR
under the PC-based transmission scheme, which is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Under the scenario where Willie and Eve are in the enemy relationship and Alice
adopts the AN-based secure transmission scheme, the CSR of the system is
REAcs = qRs(1− pEAso (ρ∗EA)), (71)
where pEAso (·) is given by (65) and the optimal power allocation parameter ρ∗EA solves pEAco (ρ, θ∗EA) =
c with θ∗EA given by (70). Note that the inequality ρ
∗
EA ≥ ρminEA must hold, where ρminEA solves
pEAso (ρ) = s. Otherwise, the CSR is not available.
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Fig. 6. Impacts of target secrecy rate Rs on CSR Rcs: PC-based scheme vs. AN-based scheme.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is thus omitted here.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide extensive numerical results to illustrate the CSR performances
of the six representative scenarios under the novel secure communication paradigm. We also
show the impacts of various system parameters (e.g., the target secrecy rate Rs, covertness
requirement c and secrecy requirement s) on the CSR performances. Unless otherwise stated,
we set the transmission probability of Alice to q = 0.5, the channel gain between Alice and
Bob to |hab|2 = 1, the parameter υ to υ = 0.001, the transmit powers of Willie and Eve
to Pw = Pe = −5 dB and the noise powers at Bob, Willie and Eve to σ2b = −20 dB and
σ2w = σ
2
e = −5 dB.
To explore the impacts of Rs on the CSR performances, we first show in Fig. 6 the CSR Rcs
vs. Rs in the three relationship cases under the constraints of c = 0.1 and s = 0.1. In each
subfigure of Fig. 6, we also plot the CSR curves of the PC-based transmission scheme and the
AN-based transmission scheme with various values of transmit power Pa. We can see from Fig.
6(a) that the CSRs achieved by both transmission schemes first increase and then decrease as
Rs increases in the independence relationship case. This implies that there exists an optimal Rs
that maximizes the CSR performance achieved by each transmission scheme.
Note that the message transmit power adopted by the AN-based scheme is ρ∗IAPa and that
adopted by the PC-based scheme is P ∗a,IP . Thus, comparing the curves in Fig. 6(a), we can
observe that the AN-based scheme achieves a smaller CSR than the PC-based scheme, when
the former adopts no more message transmit power than the latter (i.e., ρ∗IAPa < P
∗
a,IP and
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Fig. 7. Comparisons of the CSR performances in three relationship cases.
ρ∗IAPa = P
∗
a,IP ). When the AN-based scheme adopts a slightly larger message transmit power
than the PC-based scheme (i.e., ρ∗IAPa > P
∗
a,IP ), the former scheme ensures a higher CSR than
the latter. However, when the AN-based scheme adopts a much larger message transmit power
than the PC-based scheme (i.e., ρ∗IAPa  P ∗a,IP ), the CSR achieved by the former scheme is
larger than that achieved by the latter scheme only when Rs is larger than a threshold (about 0.06
in Fig. 6(a)). Thus, based on the above observations, we can conclude that, given a target secrecy
rate Rs, the AN-based transmission scheme can achieve no worse CSR performance than the PC-
based scheme by properly adjusting the message transmit power in the independence relationship
scenario.
Similar behaviors of Rcs vs. Rs can be observed from Fig. 6(b). This is because the signals
received by Willie and Eve in the friend relationship case can be treated as scaled versions of
those in the independence relationship case due to the signal sharing between Willie and Eve.
The behaviors of Rcs vs. Rs in the enemy relationship scenario are quite different from those in
the other two scenarios, as shown in Fig. 6(c). First, we can see from Fig. 6(c) that the CSR of
the PC-based scheme increases as Rs increases. This is not the case for the AN-based scheme.
As Rs increases, the CSR of the AN-based scheme increases for small message transmit powers,
while it first increases and then decreases for large message transmit powers (ρ∗EAPa  P ∗a,EP ).
Second, by comparing the curves, we can observe that the PC-based scheme always achieves
better CSR performance than the AN-based scheme when the former adopts no more message
transmit powers than the latter. However, when the PC-based scheme adopts more message
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Fig. 8. Impacts of covertness requirement c and secrecy requirement s on CSR performances.
transmit powers than the AN-based scheme, the CSR performance of the former is better than
the latter only if Rs is below a threshold (about 0.114 in Fig. 6(c)). Thus, we can conclude that
the PC-based scheme outperforms the AN-based scheme for small values of Rs, while the latter
outperforms the former for large values of Rs in the enemy relationship scenario.
We next explore the impacts of the relationships between Willie and Eve on the CSR per-
formance. Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) show the CSR Rcs vs. Rs in the three relationship cases for
the PC-based and AN-based transmission schemes, respectively. We set the transmit power of
Alice to Pa = −10 (dB) in Fig. 7(b). We can observe from both figures that the CSR in the
independence relationship case is always larger than or equal to that in the friend relationship
case. This is intuitive since Willie and Eve can improve their attacking abilities by sharing their
signals. We can also observe from both figures that the CSR in the enemy relationship case
is larger (resp. smaller) than those in the other two relationship cases when Rs is larger (resp.
smaller) than some threshold. The above observations indicate that being friends is the best
choice for the eavesdropper group and detector group when the target secrecy rate Rs is large,
while being enemies is the best choice when Rs is small.
To show the impacts of the covertness requirement c on the CSR performance, we plot
in Fig. 8(a) CSR vs. c under the PC-based and AN-based transmission schemes in the three
relationship cases, respectively. We set the transmit power of Alice under the AN-based scheme
to Pa = −10 (dB) and the secrecy requirement to s = 0.1. As can seen from Fig. 8(a), the CSR
increases as c increases under both schemes in all relationship cases. The reason is that a looser
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covertness constraint results in a larger optimal transmit power in the PC-based scheme (resp.
a larger optimal power allocation parameter in the AN-based scheme) and thus a larger CSR.
This shows a clear trade-off between the CSR performance and the covertness requirement.
Another careful observation from Fig. 8(a) indicates that the AN-based scheme outperforms
the PC-based scheme in the independence relationship case, while the latter outperforms the
former in the enemy relationship case, which is consistent with the observations from Fig.
6(a) and Fig. 6(c). However, in the friendship scenario, the PC-based scheme achieves better
CSR performance than the AN-based scheme under stringent covertness constraints. Conversely,
under loose covertness constraints, the AN-based scheme achieves better CSR performance than
the PC-based scheme. The reason behind these observations is that more stringent covertness
constraints result in smaller optimal power allocation parameters for the AN-based scheme. As
a result, less power is used for message transmissions and more power is for AN transmissions,
which thus leads to a smaller CSR than that of the PC-based scheme.
Finally, we explore the impacts of the secrecy requirement s on the CSR performance, for
which we show in Fig. 8(b) the CSR vs. s under the PC-based and AN-based transmission
schemes in the three relationship cases, respectively. We set the transmit power of Alice under
the AN-based scheme to Pa = −10 (dB) and the covertness requirement to c = 0.1. We can see
from Fig. 8(b) that, as s increases, the CSRs for both AN-based and PC-based schemes in the
friend relationship case decrease, while they increase in the enemy relationship case. This is not
the case for the independence relationship, where, as s increases, the CSR under the AN-based
scheme increases, while that under the PC-based scheme first increases and then decreases. We
can also see from Fig. 8(b) that the AN-based scheme outperforms the PC-based scheme in the
independence and friend relationship cases, while the PC-based scheme is better in the enemy
relationship case, which is consistent with the findings in Fig. 6(a).
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel secure wireless communication paradigm, where the physical
layer security technology is applied to counteract both detection and eavesdropping attacks.
To model the security performance of the novel paradigm, we conduct complete theoretical
analyses to identify the covert secrecy rate (CSR), a novel metric proposed in this paper, under
two transmission schemes (i.e., artificial noise (AN)-based and power control (PC)-based) in
three detector-eavesdropper relationship cases (i.e., independence, friend and enemy). The results
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in this paper showed that, in the independence and friend relationship cases, the AN-based
transmission scheme can achieve better CSR performance than the PC-based scheme by properly
adjusting the message transmit power. In the enemy relationship case, the AN-based transmission
scheme outperforms the PC-based transmission scheme only in certain cases. Our results also
showed that being friends (resp. enemies) is the best choice for the eavesdropper and detector,
when the target secrecy rate is large (resp. small). In addition, looser covertness constraints result
in larger CSRs for all scenarios, while this is not the case for secrecy constraints.
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